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HYPNOSIS OF THE ACCUSED:
DEFENDANT'S CHOICE
1.

INTRODUCTION

The forensic use of hypnosis is not a new phenomenon,' yet
every aspect of the use of hypnosis in criminal investigations and
trials has created sharp and unresolved controversies among the
courts 2 and experts3 in recent years. Several courts have held that
hypnotically induced 4 testimony is never admissible because practitioners in the fields of psychiatry and medicine generally have not
accepted hypnosis as a reliable method of inducing accurate memory recall. 5 Other courts have admitted hypnotically induced testimony if the proponent of the testimony proves strict adherence to
1 For a brief survey of the history of hypnosis in criminal investigation, see Herman,
The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in CriminalCases, 25 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 1-4 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hypno-Induced Statements).
2 See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982)
(witness who has been hypnotized may never testify in court to a fact in issue in that
case); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1982) (hypnotically induced testimony is
admissible if likely to result in recall comparable to normal human memory); State v.
Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2125 (1983) (admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony will be considered on a case-by-case basis).
3 See, e.g., Hurd, 86 N.J. at 533, 432 A.2d at 96; People v. Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d 230,
238, 460 N.Y.S.2d 879, 884 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (both cases quoting Dr. Martin Orne that
hypnosis is likely to cause memory distortions but adherence to his procedural guidelines safeguards hypnotic process against taint and diminishes likelihood of miscarriages
ofjustice); Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 233-34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 881 (quoting Drs. Barber and
Spiegel that hypnotically induced memory distortions are the exception rather than the
rule); see also People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 534, 453 N.E.2d 484, 489, 466 N.Y.S.2d
255, 260 (1983) (citing Dr. Bernard Diamond, who condemns the forensic use of hypnosis). The Boudin court stated that Drs. Herbert Spiegel, Theodore Barber, Martin Orne,
and Richard Hilgard are the four leading experts in the field of hypnosis. Boudin, 118
Misc. 2d at 232, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
4 The term "hypnotically induced" refers to statements initially produced during
hypnosis. Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 236, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
5 See, e.g., State ex reL Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266
(1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So. 2d 903 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1976); Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110, 205 S.E.2d 231 (1974); People v. Harper, 111 Ill. App. 2d
204, 250 N.E.2d 5 (1969); Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981); People
v. Gonzalez, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981), aff'd, 415 Mich. 615, 329
N.W.2d 743 (1982); People v. Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 297 N.W.2d 853 (1980); People v.
Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648
(1981); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983);
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procedural guidelines promulgated by Dr. Martin Orne.6 Still other
courts have held that although witnesses may not testify to memories recalled during hypnosis, they may testify to memories recalled
7
prior to hypnosis.
A survey of the scientific literature and the in-court testimony of
hypnosis experts reveals that the experts agree on a general definition of the hypnotic state s that memory distortions can occur as a
result of hypnosis, 9 that hypnosis is a suggestive procedure, 10 and
that hypnosis does not insure the veracity of statements produced in
the hypnotic state."' The experts also agree that adherence to Dr.
State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 405 P.2d 492 (1965); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 498
Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1979).
6 For a discussion of Dr. Orne's procedural guidelines, see infra notes 49-62 and
accompanying text. Dr. Orne is a Doctor of Medicine and Professor of Psychiatry at the
University of Pennsylvania, and Director of the Unit for Experimental Psychiatry and
Senior Attending Psychiatrist at the University of Pennsylvania Hospital. He also has a
Ph.D. in Psychology. He is past president of the Society for Clinical and Experimental
Hypnosis, past president of the International Society for Hypnosis, and has been editor
of the International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis for the past twenty
years. He has served as a reviewer of research proposals on hypnosis for the National
Science Foundation, the National Institute of Mental Health, the Office of Scientific Research of the United States Air Force, and the Office of Naval Research. He has published more than one hundred scientific articles. Dr. Orne has taught hypnosis,
researched the nature of hypnosis, and used hypnosis in clinical practice.
The following courts have either adopted Dr. Orne's procedural guidelines for the
use of hypnosis or have used his guidelines to promulgate their own procedural rules for
the use of hypnosis in criminal investigations and trials: People v. Gibson, 117 Ill. App.
3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368 (1983); Commonwealth v. Juvenile, 381 Mass. 727, 412
N.E.2d 339 (1980); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97
N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983); People v. Lucas, 107 Misc. 2d 231, 435 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct.
1980); People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1980); People v.
McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831,427 N.Y.S. 2d. 181 (Sup. Ct. 1980); State v. Long, 32 Wash.
App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386
(1983); State v. White, No. J-366, slip op. (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 1979).
7 See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982);
Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. 1982); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519,
447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 N.W.2d 387 (1981);
State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1981); State v. Patterson, 213 Neb. 686, 331
N.W.2d 500 (1983); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d
255 (1983).
8 See Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 233, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 881 (citing the testimony of Doctors Spiegel and Barber).
9 See id. at 233-34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 881-82 (citing the testimony of Doctors Spiegel,
Barber, Diamond, and Orne).
1O See Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 534, 453 N.E.2d at 489, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 260 (citing 9
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Macropaedia, Hypnosis, 133-34 (1981) (article by Dr. Martin
Orne)); J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 579 (2d ed. 1960);
Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38
OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 570 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements].
I I See Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements, supra note 10, at 584; Orne, Use and Misuse of
Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'LJ. OF CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 317-18 (1979),
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Ome's guidelines will increase the probability of gaining reliable in12
formation from a hypnotized subject.
This Comment will demonstrate that in light of the agreement
among experts about the nature and reliable uses of hypnosis,
courts should adopt Dr. Orne's guidelines and use them to test the
admissibility of hypnotically induced confessions and exculpatory
statements. Not only do the guidelines ensure that the hypnotically
induced information will be reasonably reliable,' 3 but use of the
guidelines will also protect the defendants' constitutional rights to
aid in their own defenses and to be free from self-incrimination.
The guidelines do not, however, guarantee the voluntariness or the
veracity of hypnotically induced statements. Thus, in cases where
hypnosis produces confessions, courts may not admit those confessions unless the defendant also gives informed consent in the presence of counsel to the hypnosis, and the prosecution produces
independent verification of the confession.
The analysis begins with a brief overview of the scientific opinions regarding the nature of hypnosis. The Comment then discusses the possible uses of hypnosis on the accused in criminal
investigations and trials. Next, the Comment focuses on Dr. Martin
Ome's guidelines for the forensic use of hypnosis and the relation
of his guidelines to the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony. The analysis then considers solutions to the problems involved with the use of hypnosis by the prosecution and defense to
obtain confessions and exculpatory statements from criminal suspects and defendants. The Comment shows that suspects and defendants have constitutional rights to use hypnosis to aid in the
reprinted in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE 61, 63 (M. Tonrey & N. Morris eds. 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court; page citations refer to CRIME AND JUSTICE
publication unless otherwise specified]; Spiegel, Hypnosis and Evidence: Help or Hindrance,
347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 73, 79 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hypnosis and Evidence].
12 See Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 238-39, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85. The court cited the
testimony of Doctors Barber and Spiegel, who maintain that hypnotically induced information is more reliable when "the integrity of the hypnotic procedure is preserved";
thus, several New York courts have adopted variations of the Orne guidelines in order to
preserve the integrity of the hypnotic process and thereby increase the reliability of hypnotically induced information. Id. The court in Boudin specifically rejected the adoption
of a per se rule for or against admitting hypnotically induced statements into evidence,
and stated:
to adopt a rigid posture for or against admissibility is to ignore the diversity and
complexity of situations involving hypnosis. These [Orne] safeguards also suggest
that the hazards of hypnosis can be minimized to the point where the testimony
which has been refreshed by hypnosis can be deemed reliable, and therefore
admissible.
Id.
13 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92. See infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
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preparation of their own defenses and to be free from the use of
hypnosis in order to avoid self-incrimination. Finally, this Comment
argues that courts should admit hypnotically induced exculpatory
statements of the accused when hypnotists follow Orne's procedural
guidelines. Courts should not admit hypnotically induced confessions, however, unless, in addition to adherence to Orne's guidelines, defendants also give informed consent to the hypnosis and the
prosecution independently verifies the confession.
II.
A.

DEFINING THE NATURE AND RELIABLE USES OF HYPNOSIS

THE NATURE OF HYPNOSIS

Hypnosis experts generally agree that the hypnotic state is "one
of increased relaxation wherein the subject can concentrate or focus
on a particular area." 14 They also agree that the way in which the
hypnotist conducts the hypnosis affects the qnality of the information produced under hypnosis. 15 They further agree that hypnotized subjects may experience "the phenomena of fantasy, increased
suggestibility, concreting, confabulation and other so-called 'con16
taminations' of the memory process" during and after hypnosis.
Finally, all of the experts agree that only licensed psychiatrists or
14 Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 233, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 881 (citing Drs. Spiegel and Barber).
15 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91.
16 Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 233, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 881. Experts define "confabulation"
as the filling in of "forgotten details between remembered events, in accordance with
what ... [subjects]... deduce should have occurred as opposed to what they actually
remember." R. UDOLF, FORENSIc HYPNOSIS 190 (1983). "Concreting" occurs when
subjects become innocently convinced of the truth of their memories. Id. (referring to
concreting as the "honest liar" syndrome). Concreting occurs in the normal memory
process, but a hypnotized person is more susceptible to the phenomenon. Id.; cf Boudin,
118 Misc. 2d at 234, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 881 (citing Drs. Spiegel and Barber that concreting
"rarely occurs and if it does, it only occurs with a highly suggestible subject and where
there has been a deliberate attempt to impose the 'concreting' process on the subject").
Dr. Martin Orne also believes that the behavior of the hypnotist affects the degree
to which concreting and confabulation occur. Dr. Orne recently testified in a case involving the hypnosis of a defendant accused of murder. The defendant claimed prior to
hypnosis that he was asleep at the time of the murder, but after hypnosis the defendant
confessed to the murder. Orne testified that
[i]t
is very characteristic to find some element of what happened during the time
before or after the events during which somebody doesn't recall anything. . . .[I1f
he's been asleep, then he would take something from before and after and put that
into the period which he's trying to remember things for . . . and he would use
those elements of reality in confabulating what he's put in there. . . . [E]mpirical
research . . . shows that if you try and have someone remember something . . .
while in fact they were . . . asleep, and they do remember it during hypnosis, it is
easily incorporated into their normal memory subsequently and becomes what they
believe occurred while they in fact were asleep. . . . [U]nder the circumstances [of
this case] . . . there would have been no conflicting recall. . . . [The defendant]
• . . had been given suggestions that he in fact did it [the murder] before he was
hypnotized.. . . [H]e now is hypnotized and told that he will come up with true
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psychologists trained in the use of hypnosis should perform
17
hypnosis.
The experts disagree, however, over the extent to which hypnosis causes memory contamination. They also disagree on whether
hypnotically induced information is reliable. At one extreme, Dr.
Diamond, a forensic psychologist, argues that no one can know
whether hypnosis completely contaminates the memory; he believes
that courts should bar not only hypnotically induced testimony, but
also all testimony of any person hypnotized to recall facts about the
case the court is hearing.' 8 Dr. Martin Orne has developed procedural guidelines that he believes diminish the dangers of memory
contamination, and he supports admission of hypnotically induced
testimony if the proponent of the testimony independently verifies
the testimony. 19 Drs. Barber and Spiegel believe that few contaminations of the memory occur in hypnosis and would admit hypnotically induced testimony in most cases. 20
Thus, only one doctor, who is not a hypnosis expert, argues
that hypnotically induced testimony should never be admissible in
court. The remaining experts agree on the nature of the hypnotic
state and would admit hypnotically induced testimony in court, at
least in cases where the proponent of the testimony proves adherence to Dr. Orne's procedural guidelines. The courts, meanwhile,
have used the experts' agreements and disagreements to make their
recollections. When he comes up with recollections . . . the hypnotist validates
• . . [the recollections by] . . . saying these are the truth.
Report of Proceedings on Motion to Suppress at 102-05, People v. William Boyd, Jr.,
No. 81 C 6190 (2d Dist., 111. Feb. 28, 1983) (direct testimony of Dr. Martin Orne); see also
Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, supra note 11, at 61 (degree of concreting depends on
individual's belief in ability of hypnosis to yield truth and on integrity of hypnotist in
employing hypnosis).
17 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96; see also 27 INT'L.J. OF CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOsIs 452 (1979) (the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis and the
International Society of Hypnosis adopt resolutions condemning use of hypnosis by police-trained hypnotists).
18 People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982) (relying
on the testimony of Dr. Bernard Diamond). The California Supreme Court is the only
court that has completely adopted Dr. Diamond's view that courts should bar all testimony of any person hypnotized to recall facts about the case the court is hearing. Other
courts do not consider Dr. Diamond an expert in the field of hypnosis, and he does not
consider himself an expert in the field. Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 233, 460 N.Y.S.2d at
881. Dr. Diamond's article, Inherent Problems in the Use of PretrialHypnosis on a Prospective
Witness, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 313 (1980), though frequently quoted, is highly controversial.
Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 233, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 880. Diamond has not used hypnosis since
1968, and he has not done any clinical work in hypnosis to support his conclusions. Id.
at 236, 460 N.Y.S. 2d at 882.
19 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 539, 432 A.2d at 93 (citing Use andMisuse of Hypnosis, supra note 11,
at 317-18).
20 Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 233-34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
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own determinations of whether to admit hypnotically induced
testimony.
B.

USES OF HYPNOSIS ON THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
AND TRIALS

The results of hypnotic sessions with defendants can be put to
three possible uses. First, defense counsel can use hypnotically induced information to obtain leads to other information. 2 ' Second,
the prosecution can use hypnosis to obtain a confession. 22 Finally,
defense counsel can use hypnosis to obtain exculpatory statements. 23 Courts thus far have permitted the use of hypnosis to obtain leads to other information, but generally have not admitted
hypnotically induced confessions or alibis. In determining whether
to permit each of the three uses, courts have focused on the scientific controversy over the degree of reliability of hypnotically in21 See Cornell v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447
(1959).
22 See Report of Proceedings on Motion to Suppress, People v. William Boyd,Jr., No.
81 C 6129 (2d Dist. Ill. Feb. 18, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Boyd Proceedings, Feb. 18];
Report of Proceedings on Motion to Suppress, Boyd, No. 81 C 6190 (2d Dist. Ill., Feb.
28, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28]; Report of Proceedings
on Motion to Suppress, Boyd, No. 81 C 6129 (2d Dist. Ill., Feb. 28, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb. 28]; Motion to Suppress Statements, Boyd, No. 816129 (Cook County, Ill., Crim. Div., filed April 6, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Boyd Motion to Suppress]; Motion to Dismiss Indictment, Boyd, No. 81-6129 (Cook County, Ill.,
Crim. Div., filedJune 11, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Boyd Motion to Dismiss]; Silberman,
Hypnotic Confession, The Reader, Sept. 2, 1983, at 1, cols. 1-2 [hereinafter cited as Silberman] (Boyd decision on motion to suppress confession published only here). The court
did not publish its opinion. For other cases involving the admissibility of hypnotically
induced confessions, see Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (refusing admission of
confession gained under circumstances amounting to mental coercion); Coon v. State,
380 So. 2d 980 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), aft'd, 380 So. 2d 990 (Ala. 1980) (admitting
defendant's confession although police hypnotized defendant before defendant confessed); People v. Norcott, 44 Ill. 2d 256, 255 N.E.2d 442 (1970) (admitting defendant's
confession despite defendant's contentions that the police hypnotized him and he therefore confessed involuntarily); State v. Walker, 416 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. 1967) (admitting
defendant's confession despite defendant's contention that police took him to professor
who hypnotized him); People v. Baldi, 80 Misc. 2d 118, 362 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct.
1974), rev'd, 76 A.D.2d 259, 429 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1980), rev'd, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 429 N.E.2d
400, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981) (admitting defendant's confession despite facts that defendant confessed while in trance-like state and police previously had caused psychiatrist
to hypnotize defendant); Rex v. Booher, 4 D.L.R. 795 (Can. 1928) (confession excluded
because obtained after defendant had session with doctor who practiced mesmerism); R.
UDOLF, supra note 16, at 108 (stating that the defendant in Leyra probably was
hypnotized).
23 See, e.g., People v. Ebands, 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897); People v. Hangsleben,
86 Mich. App. 718, 273 N.W.2d 539 (1978); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508
(1950); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974), writ of habeas
corpus denied sub nom. Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976).
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duced information. The courts permit or reject the use of hypnosis
depending on their resolution of the reliability issue.
The first use of hypnosis, to obtain leads to other information,
presents no reliability problem because counsel is not attempting to
admit the substance of any hypnotically induced statements in
court. 24 For example, in Cornell v. Superior Court of San Diego County,
the defendant's counsel sought to hypnotize the defendant to discover derivative evidence. 2 5 The court held that the reliability of the
defendant's statements under hypnosis was not an issue because the
defense did not seek to admit those statements in court.2 6 Citing
the defendant's constitutional right to counsel, the court held that
this right included the right to consult privately with counsel and
27
with any experts counsel might require to prepare the defense.
The second use, admission of hypnotically induced confessions,
can present problems of reliability and voluntariness. In the unreported case of People v. William Boyd, Jr., the prosecution hypnotized
Boyd without his consent. 28 During hypnosis, Boyd "confessed" to
murdering a young girl. 29 The prosecution then sought to admit
Boyd's hypnotically induced murder confession in court.8 0 The
court did not publish an opinion, but the record of the pretrial hearing indicates that the controversy centered on two issues. Defense
counsel argued first that Boyd did not voluntarily confess because
he had not expressly consented to the use of hypnosis. 31 Defense
counsel then argued that hypnosis in general is not reliable to enhance accurate memory recall,3 2 and that the hypnotic procedure
used on Boyd was particularly unreliable for purposes of producing
24 People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 536, 453 N.E.2d 484, 490, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255,
260-61 (1983) (experts agree that the use of hypnosis to obtain leads is permissible
because issue of reliability is moot once proponent independently verifies hypnotically
induced information).
25 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959).
26 Id. at 102, 338 P.2d at 449. In Cornell, the State charged the defendant with murder. Due to "'intoxication, shock, or otherwise,'" the defendant was unable to remember his whereabouts during the time of the murder. Id. at 101, 338 P.2d at 448. Prior to
hypnosis of the accused, defense counsel was able to ascertain only that his client was
"wandering from bar to bar" on the night of the murder. Id.
27 Id. at 102-03, 338 P.2d at 449.
28 Boyd Proceedings, Feb. 18, supra note 22; Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28, supra
note 22; Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 73; see infra note 75 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how the police hypnotized Boyd without Boyd's
consent.
29 Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 32, 169, 173.
30 Boyd Motion to Suppress, supra note 22, at 1.
31 Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb. 18, supra note 22, at 13, 73, 92, 96, 180.
32 Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 74.
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accurate memory recall. 33 The court excluded Boyd's confession
because the confession was neither voluntary nor reliable.3 4 The
court, however, did not resolve the question of when to admit hypnotically induced confessions because it did not address solutions to
the voluntariness and reliability problems.
The third use of hypnosis on an accused, defense counsel's use
of hypnosis to obtain exculpatory statements and to admit those
statements in court, also forces courts to focus on the reliability
problem. In Greenfield v. Robinson 35 and People v. Hangsleben,3 6 the defendants agreed to use hypnosis to help them recall the events of
the nights in question. In neither case did the hypnosis help uncover independent evidence that might have absolved those accused
of the crimes. In both cases, the defendants' counsel sought to admit the defendants' hypnotically induced statements to bolster the
credibility of the defendants' prehypnotic statements of innocence. 3 7 Both courts excluded the hypnotically induced statements
because of the "potential unreliability" 38 of hypnotic evidence. 3 9 In
both cases, the hypnotically induced statements were the only excul40
patory evidence that the defendants' counsel had at their disposal,
but because neither counsel could overcome the reliability problem,
41
the courts excluded their only exculpatory evidence.
33 Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 102-05.
34 Silberman, supra note 22, at 34.
35 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976) (denying writ of habeas corpus from conviction in Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974)).
36 86 Mich. App. 718, 278 N.W.2d 539 (1978).
37 Greenfield, 413 F. Supp. at 1120 (defense argued that admission of hypnotically

induced testimony would enable defendant to fully develop his defense); Hangsleben, 86
Mich. App. at 727-28, 273 N.W.2d at 543 (defense argued that admission of hypnotically
induced testimony would explain discrepancies in defendant's earlier inconsistent admissions to police).
38 Greenfield, 413 F. Supp. at 1120.
39 Id.; Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. at 730-31, 273 N.W.2d at 544. Defendants' counsel
in both cases also sought to refer to the fact of the hypnosis, without admitting the
hypnotically induced statements, to bolster the credibility and explain the inconsistencies of the defenses. Greenfield, 413 F. Supp. at 1117; Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. at 728,
273 N.W.2d at 543. Neither court allowed this use of hypnosis. Greenfield, 413 F. Supp.
at 1117; Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. at 729, 273 N.W.2d at 544.
40 Greenfield, 413 F. Supp. at 1120 (defense had no positive evidence about an alternative murder weapon, and neither prosecution nor defense had any direct evidence of the
crime); Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. at 727-31, 237 N.W.2d at 543-45 (all evidence was
either circumstantial or consisted of defendant's prehypnotic incriminating statements
and posthypnotic exculpatory statements).
41 See also State v. Conley, 6 Kan. App. 2d 280, 627 P.2d 1174 (1981) (substance of
defendant's hypnotic session offered by accused to prove truth of matters asserted held
inadmissible absent binding agreement by both parties); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46
N.W.2d 508 (1950) (defense offered to admit audio recordings of hypnotic sessions in
which all statements by accused tended to show innocence of the accused; court held
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Therefore, both hypnotically induced confessions and exculpatory statements present reliability problems. Dr. Orne's guidelines
resolve the reliability problem because adherence to the guidelines
reasonably ensures the reliability of the hypnotically induced information. 42 Several courts have adopted Dr. Orne's guidelines and
require proof of adherence to the guidelines to admit the hypnotic43
ally induced statements of witnesses and victims in criminal cases.
The remainder of this Comment will show that by adopting Orne's
guidelines and, in cases of hypnotically induced confessions, by requiring informed consent and independent verification, courts will
have a principled test to determine the admissibility of defendants'
hypnotically induced confessions and exculpatory statements.
III.

ADMISSIBILITY AT TRIAL OF DEFENDANTS' PRETRIAL
HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED STATEMENTS

A.

DR. ORNE'S PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES AND THEIR RELATION TO
ADMISSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS' HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED
CONFESSIONS AND EXCULPATORY STATEMENTS

Admitting the results of a scientific test into evidence depends

not upon guarantees of veracity, 4 4 but only upon whether the test is
recordings inadmissible without explanation); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1974) (substance of defendant's pretrial hypnosis and doctor's opinion as to truthfulness of defendant's hypnotic statements deemed inadmissible because unreliable).
42 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 535-46, 432 A.2d at 93-97 (if proponent of hypnotically induced
testimony follows Orne's guidelines, proponent will satisfy Frye test of general reliability). See infra note 45 and accompanying text for a discussion of Frye; see also Boudin, 118
Misc. 2d at 239, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (guidelines suggest hazards of hypnosis can be
minimized to the point where hypnotically refreshed testimony is reliable and therefore
admissible).
43 See supra note 6 and cases cited therein.
44 The court in State v. Hurd stated:
[T]he court below did not demand, as a pre-condition of admissibility, that hypnosis
be generally accepted as a means of reviving truthful or historically accurate recall.
We think this was correct. The purpose of using hypnosis is not to obtain truth, as a
polygraph or "truth serum" is supposed to do. Instead, hypnosis is employed as a
means of overcoming amnesia and restoring the memory of a witness. See Spector
and Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38
OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 584 (1977) ....
In light of this purpose, hypnosis can be considered reasonably reliable if it is able to yield recollections as accurate as those of
an ordinary witness, which likewise are often historically inaccurate.
86 N.J. at 537-38, 432 A.2d at 92. In State v. Collins, the court stated:
"What next? Once we begin to rule evidence inadmissible because of our dissatisfaction with the witness' credibility based on improper memory jogging, where
do we stop? What about witnesses who have been brainwashed, coached, coerced,
bribed or intimidated? Are we going to reject all this testimony because it is suspect? ...
Once having undergone exposure to something of this nature is the witness still going to be allowed to give his best recollection, or be precluded from
testifying?
"I am firmly of the belief that jurors are quite capable of seeing through flaky

1004

COMMENTS

[Vol. 75

"generally recognized as reliable for the purpose used by experts in
the appropriate scientific community." '4 5 Experts do not use hypnosis for the purpose of guaranteeing the truthfulness of hypnotically
induced statements; 46 rather, psychiatrists and psychologists use
hypnosis to induce concentration on a past event so that the subject
will reveal previously unremembered aspects of the event.4 7 Prop-

erly conducting the hypnotic process increases the likelihood that
the hypnotically induced information will be reliable. 48 The guidelines discussed below are designed to ensure the proper management of the hypnotic process, and to "minimize the likelihood of
serious miscarriages ofjustice" when criminal investigators use hypnosis. 49 An evaluation and application of each of the procedural
guidelines to defendants' hypnotically induced statements shows
that courts should require proof of adherence to the guidelines as
the test for admissibility of hypnotically induced confessions and exculpatory statements.
Dr. Orne's guidelines consist of the following:
testimony and pseudo scientific claptrap. I quite agree that we should not waste our
valuable court time watching witch doctors, voodoo practitioners or brujas go
through the entrails of dead chickens in a fruitless search for the truth. . . . However, the idea that an eyeball witness to a transaction be denied the opportunity to
tell ajury his recollections of what he saw is disturbing to me whether that recollection has been refreshed by hypnosis, truth serum, drugs, intimidation, coercion,
coaching, brainwashing or impaired by the plain old passage of time."
296 Md. 670, 716, 464 A.2d 1028, 1051 (1983) (Murphy, CJ., concurring and dissenting) (quoting People v. Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 927-28, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 50102 (1982) (Garner, J., concurring)). See also Hypno-Induced Statements, supra note 1, at 19
n.100 (berating high standard of reliability required for admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony when eyewitness testimony causes more miscarriages of justice than
any other form of proof).
45 Frye v. United States, 203 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (first formulation of general
rule governing admissibility of scientific evidence). In addition to showing the reliability
of the test, the party who wants to admit the test results must also show that the test was
"conducted. . . in accordance with recognized procedures," R. UDOLF, supra note 16, at
177 (interpreting Frye rule), and that the probative value of the test results will outweigh
any risk of misleading thejury. FED. R. EVID. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if
risk of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time outweighs the probative value of the evidence). See also Hurd, 86 NJ. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91 (risks of prejudice, confusion, and
waste of time may outweigh probative value of evidence if procedure used to obtain
evidence is not capable of yielding reasonably reliable results).
46 See, e.g., Use andMisuse of Hypnosis in Court, supra note 11, at 61, 97-98; Admissibility of
Hypnotic Statements, supra note 10, at 584; Hypnosis and Evidence, supra note 11, at 79; see
also Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 60 (when professionals use hypnosis for therapeutic treatment, they are not interested in whether hypnotically induced
information is truthful) (direct examination of Dr. Orne).
47 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92.
48 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 538-46, 432 A.2d at 94-97; Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 239, 460
N.Y.S.2d at 884.
49 Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, supra note 11, at 62-63.
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1. A licensed psychologist or psychiatrist trained in hypnosis
must perform the hypnosis.
2. The doctor must be independent of and not regularly employed by the defense or the prosecution.
3. The doctor should receive a written memo of only those
facts of the crime that the doctor needs to know to conduct the
hypnosis.
4. The subject must give a prehypnotic statement of the facts
as the subject recalls the facts prior to the hypnosis.
5. All contacts between the doctor and the subject must be
recorded, preferably on video tape, but at least on audio tape.
6. Only the doctor and the subject should be present during
the session.5 0
Only licensed psychiatrists and psychologists trained in the use
of hypnosis should perform hypnosis because such people are more
likely than lay hypnotists or police officers to obtain accurate memory recall. 5 ' Police officers in particular are likely to ask the subject
too many leading and suggestive questions in order to obtain information favorable to the prosecution. 5 2 Licensed psychiatrists and
50 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97. The Hurd court also required that the
psychiatrist conduct a prehypnotic interview to determine the type of memory loss incurred because some types of memory loss are more amenable to hypnotic restoration
than others. Id. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95-96. Thus, the Hurd court required that the proponent of hypnotic evidence must (1) prove clear and convincing compliance with
Orne's guidelines, (2) prove that the type of memory loss is amenable to hypnotic restoration, and (3) prove that neither the doctor nor anyone else used any "impermissibly
suggestive or coercive conduct" at any time during the hypnosis. Id. at 533, 432 A.2d at
90; id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
51 Id. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96.
52 See, e.g., Boyd Motion to Suppress, supra note 22, at 14. In Boyd, the defense argued
that Dr. Trausch, the doctor who hypnotically induced the defendant's confession, suggested Boyd's entire confession to Boyd while Boyd was under hypnosis. Dr. Trausch
was a former officer of the police force that arrested Boyd. Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb.
18, supra note 22, at 506; Silberman, supra note 22, at 29. No one informed Boyd and
Boyd's mother that Dr. Trausch was a former policeman before the Boyds agreed to let
him examine the defendant. Boyd Motion to Suppress, supra note 22, at 12. At the time
of the Boyd case, Dr. Trausch was not a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist in the state
of Illinois. Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb. 18, supra note 22, at 108. The confession Dr.
Trausch hypnotically induced was neither voluntary nor accurate; thus, the court rejected the confession. Silberman, supra note 22, at 34.
Dr. Udolf argues that the accuracy of hypnotically induced information depends on
the quality of the hypnotist-subject relationship. R. UDOLF, supra note 16, at 45. According to Udolf, the more neutral the relationship, the more accurate the hypnotically induced information is likely to be. Udolf further notes that police officer hypnotists are
under pressure to obtain information favorable to their employers, and that police officer hypnotists usually have a "patently inaccurate" view of the memory process. Id. at
23. Police officer hypnotists often believe and espouse that the mind is like a video
recorder that records and stores everything the mind encounters. Id. Psychiatrists
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psychologists, trained in the use of hypnosis, are not only more
likely than police hypnotists to obtain accurate memory recall, they
are also more likely to qualify as experts capable of aiding the court
53
in evaluating the reliability of the particular procedure.
The second guideline, which requires that the doctor must be
independent and not regularly employed by the prosecution or defense, "will safeguard against any bias on the part of the hypnotist
that might translate into leading questions, unintentional cues, or
54
other suggestive conduct."
The reason for Orne's third requirement is that a written or
taped memorandum of the facts known to the doctor at the time of
hypnosis "will help the court determine the extent of information
the hypnotist could have communicated to the . . . [subject] . . .
either directly or through suggestion." 55 For example, if the doctor
knows only that the police suspect that the subject has committed a
murder, but the doctor does not know how the murder was committed, the doctor will be less likely to suggest details that the subject,
trained in the use of hypnosis, on the other hand, "believe memory to be a constructive
and distortion-prone process." Id. at 23, 29; see also Antrim, Your Memory Stands Accused,
91 Sci. DIG. 11, 77 (1983) (memory is not a recorder; it is continually molded by variables such as stress and violence).
For further discussion, see People v. Smith, 117 Misc. 2d 732, 495 N.Y.S.2d 528,
543 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (it is important that hypnotists' questions be models of nonleading
questions because hypnotized people are more receptive to suggestions than others);
Margolin, Hypnosis-Enhanced Testimony: Valid Evidence or Prosecutor'sTool?, 17 TRIAL 42, 45
(Oct. 1981) (method of hypnosis is easy for police to learn " 'but hypnosis is like a scalpel: you wouldn't want it wielded by your janitor, only by your surgeon.' ") (quoting
Orne, The Nature of Hypnosis: Artifact and Essence, 8 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 277,
277 (1959)).
53 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96. The Hurd court went on to explain that
hypnosis experts should testify only on the reliability of the specific procedure of hypnosis
in the case at bar once the court has found the general use of hypnosis to be reliable:
As the trial court found, the experts who testified at trial indicated that in appropriate cases and where properly conducted the use of hypnosis to refresh memory is
comparable in reliability to ordinary recall. Therefore, . . . hypnosis is admissible
in a criminal trial if the trial court finds that the use of hypnosis in the particular case
was reasonably likely to result in recall comparable in accuracy to normal human
memory. If the testimony is admissible, the opponent may still challenge the reliability of the particular procedures followed in the individual case by introducing
expert testimony at trial, but the opponent may not attempt to prove the general
unreliability of hypnosis. The trier of fact must then decide how much weight to
accord the hypnotically refreshed testimony.
Id. at 543. 432 A.2d at 95.
54 Id. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96; see also R. UDOLF, supra note 16, at 45. Udolf argues that
hypnotists regularly employed by one party will be under pressure to justify their fees by
producing results favorable to their employers; Dr. Udolf thus stresses the importance
of employing a neutral doctor to perform hypnosis in criminal cases. R. UDOLF, supra
note 16, at 45. Udolf also suggests that the hypnotist be court-appointed. Id.
55 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 546, 432 A.2d at 96.
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56
in a heightened state of suggestibility, might accept as true.

Orne's fourth requirement of obtaining a detailed prehypnotic
statement from the subject of the facts of the event increases the
likelihood that the hypnotist will "avoid influencing the description
by asking structured questions or adding new details." '5 7 A
prehypnotic statement by the subject will also decrease the likelihood of attempts by counsel for either side to influence the content
of the questions the hypnotist will ask the subject.
Orne's fifth requirement, the videotaping of all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject, will establish a record of the
prehypnotic, hypnotic, and posthypnotic periods. 58 This visual record will enable "a court to determine what information or suggestions the . . . [subject] . . . may have received during the session
and what recall was first elicited though hypnosis." 5 9 Additionally, a
visual record will deter the hypnotist and counsel from attempting
to distort the subject's recall by verbal and visual cues and suggestions. 60 Finally, the production of a complete visual record will obviate the need for extensive judicial reliance on expert answers to
56 See, e.g., Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb. 18, supra note 22, at 47, 63, 71. In Boyd, Dr.
Trausch claimed that he did not know the exact cause of death before he hypnotized
Boyd. (The record is unclear about how much Dr. Trausch knew about the crime before
he hypnotized Boyd. Neither the police nor Dr. Trausch followed any of Orne's guidelines for recording the hypnotic process. Id. at 151.) Thus, when Boyd confessed to Dr.
Trausch that he smothered the victim to death, id. at 32, 169, 173, Dr. Trausch accepted
the confession as the truth and took Boyd to the police so that Boyd could tell them the
truth. Id. at 33. An autopsy later revealed that the deceased died by ligature strangulation. Silberman, supra note 22, at 32. Dr. Trausch did not question Boyd about strangulation, nor about bite marks found on the deceased's body, nor did Boyd talk about
these details while he was under hypnosis. Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb. 18, supra note
22, at 173. Thus, Boyd's attorney was able to show by an independent autopsy and
ondontology report, id. at 3, that Boyd's confession was false. See infra note 76 for a
discussion of the facts of the Boyd case.
57 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 546, 432 A.2d at 96.
58 Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97.
59 Id.
60 A record of the hypnotic process will guard not only against blatantly suggestive
or leading questions, but also will enable the parties to determine whether the hypnotist
used any subtler form of suggestion. For instance, the posthypnotic suggestion-the
command given by the hypnotist to the subject just before or immediately after recovery
from the hypnotic state-largely determines how the subject will view the statements the
subject made under hypnosis. Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 31. If
the hypnotist tells the subject that what the subject has just remembered under hypnosis
is the truth, the subject probably will believe that the hypnotically induced statements
are true, and concreting will occur. Id. at 63; see supra note 16 for an explanation of
concreting. A recording of the entire hypnotic process will help capture more indirect,
but equally misleading posthypnotic suggestions. In the Boyd case, the hypnotist said to
the defendant at the end of the hypnotic session, "Let's go tell people what happened,
let's go talk to your mom." Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb. 18, supra note 22, at 30-33. Dr.
Martin Orne testified that to a fourteen-year-old boy, the hypnotist's statement becomes
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complicated hypotheticals about the hypnotic procedure to determine whether the procedure used on the defendant was impermissi6
bly suggestive or coercive. '
Finally, Dr. Orne requires that the hypnotist and the subject be
the only persons present during all phases of the hypnotic procedure. "Although it may be easier for a person familiar with the investigation to conduct some of the questioning, the risk of
undetectable, inadvertent suggestion is too great. . . . Likewise,
the mere presence of such a person may influence the response of
62
the subject."
Thus, Dr. Orne's guidelines ensure that the hypnotic process
will be conducted in a manner deemed reliable by most members of
the scientific community trained in the use of hypnosis. 63 Most experts and many courts agree that adherence to Orne's guidelines
will produce information reliable enough for courts to admit that
information into evidence. 64 Although adherence to the guidelines
will not guarantee the veracity of hypnotically induced statements,
adherence to the guidelines ensures that in many cases the hypnotically induced recall will be as reliable as that of normal memory
65
recall.
In addition to Orne's guidelines, courts should require that the
prosecution meet two additional requirements when the prosecution hypnotizes a suspect or defendant. First, the prosecution must
prove that the defendant gave informed consent to the hypnosis in
"What you have told me is the truth. . . [l]et's tell your mother the truth." Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 107.
61 See, e.g., People v. Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d 230, 232, 460 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (Sup. Ct.
1983) (three of four leading experts testified at trial); Margolin & Sinoway, HypnoticallyInduced False Confession to Murder: Preliminary Questions RegardingConsent, Admissibility in Evidence and Other Legal Issues, A.B.A. NAT'L INST. ON EXCLUSIONARY RutEs, Mar.-Apr. 1977,

ch. 7, § 3, at 421 n. 14 [hereinafter cited as Hypnotically-Induced False Confession to Murder]
(as of 1976, experts charged in excess of $2000 per day to prepare trial testimony and
appear in court); Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 120, 132 (Dr. Orne
berated the police for necessitating his appearance at trial, at a cost of $1500 per day for
his trial appearance and $150 per hour for his trial preparation. Because the police
made no visual or audio record of the hypnosis procedure, the court had to rely on Dr.
Orne's oral testimony and hypotheticals to determine the quality of Boyd's hypnotically
induced confession.).
62 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97. But see State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 676,
464 A.2d 1028, 1031 (1983) (psychiatrist prefers police officer or investigator present
during hypnosis but admits this process is not in accord with the practices of most hypnotic experts).
63 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 543, 545, 432 A.2d at 95, 96; Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 238, 239,460
N.Y.S.2d at 884.
64 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 543, 545,432 A.2d at 95, 96; Boudin, 118 Misc. 2d at 238, 239,460
N.Y.S.2d at 884.
65 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
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the presence of counsel.6 6 Informed consent to the use of hypnosis
in the presence of counsel will ensure that a defendant's hypnotically induced confession is voluntary. 67 Second, courts should require independent verification of all hypnotically induced
confessions before admitting those confessions into evidence because hypnosis does not guarantee the veracity of hypnotically in68
duced statements, but merely aids in memory recall.
Consequently, when prosecutors use hypnosis to obtain confessions
from suspects and defendants, the prosecution must independently
verify the confession to meet the prosecution's burden of proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 69 Because hypnosis induces a
highly suggestive state of mind, prosecutors who wish to hypnotize
suspects and defendants should adhere to the additional safeguards
of informed consent and independent verification in order to prevent the possibilities of involuntary or false self-incrimination.
B.

HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED CONFESSIONS

Involuntary confessions are inadmissible against a defendant in
court. 70 Thus, the party seeking to admit a hypnotically induced
confession must first prove that the defendant voluntarily consented
to the use of hypnosis. 7 1 Second, the proponent of the hypnotically
induced confession must prove that the hypnotic procedure was not
72
conducted in an impermissibly suggestive or coercive manner.
Third, because hypnosis does not guarantee the veracity of the hypnotically induced statements, the proponent of the hypnotically induced confession must independently verify the confession in order
See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 74-75, 80-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 73, 85-88 and accompanying text.
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (prosecution'bears the burden of establishing voluntariness of the confession by a preponderance of the evidence); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (involuntary confessions are not admissible in court, and
test of voluntariness is "the totality of the circumstances" under which the defendant
confessed).
71 Silberman, supra note 22, at 34 (holding hypnotically induced confession not admissible when defendant did not voluntarily consent to use of hypnosis). Involuntary
hypnosis is hypnosis "produced without the explicit consent of the subject, as opposed
to hypnosis against the will of the subject. The latter means hypnosis produced despite
the subject's active opposition, which is extremely unlikely if not impossible." R. UDOLF,
supra note 16, at 192-93; see also Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 34-35,
41, 73 (Orne testifying that it is possible to hypnotize a subject without the subject's
knowledge).
72 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 533, 432 A.2d at 90.
66
67
68
69
70
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to sustain the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 73
In People v. William Boyd, Jr.,74 the fourteen-year-old defendant,
without the aid of counsel, allowed a "doctor" obtained by the police to perform a "relaxation technique" on him. 75 The police told
Boyd that the doctor would help him to remember the events of the
night before when someone murdered a girl in the defendant's back
yard. 7 6 Immediately following the the conclusion of the "relaxation
technique," Boyd confessed to the police that he had smothered the
victim to death. 7 7 In a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress the
confession, the court ruled that the "relaxation technique"
amounted to hypnosis. 78 The court further held that because Boyd
had not knowingly consented to the use of hypnosis, Boyd's hypnotically induced confession was not voluntary and was therefore
73 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (due process requires state to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases).
74 Boyd Proceedings, Feb. 18, supra note 22; Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28, supra
note 22; Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb. 28, supra note 22. See supra note 22 for complete
citations to the Boyd case.
75 When asked to describe his "relaxation technique," the doctor in the Boyd case
stated that he took the defendant to a comfortable private room, wrapped him in a blanket, and asked him to relax by focusing on his breathing. Boyd Proceedings 6129, Feb.
18, supra note 22, at 18-22. The doctor then told the defendant to lie down, close his
eyes, and continue breathing deeply. Id. at 24-25. The doctor then began questioning
the defendant about the murder and eventually obtained a "confession." Id. at 27-33;
see also Silberman, supra note 22, at 30 (Pomaro, J., held "relaxation technique" was in
fact hypnosis).
76 Boyd Proceedings, Feb. 18, supra note 22, at 13. Boyd's sister and several other
young teenagers spent Friday evening, July 17, 1981, playing strip poker in the Boyds'
backyard playhouse. During the course of the game, Mary Kozinski, the murder victim,
rebuffed Boyd. The children had planned to sleep in the playhouse, but the Boyds'
father eventually ordered the Boyd children to come inside the house. At that time, the
other children went home and only Kozinski spent the night in the playhouse. Silberman, supra note 22, at 27.
At 10:00 a.m. Saturday, July 18, 1981, the defendant went out to the playhouse and
discovered the mutilated body of Mary Kozinski under a pillow. Id. Throughout Saturday and into the early morning hours of Sunday, July 19, the police interrogated young
Boyd at home and at the station house. The police repeatedly told Mrs. Boyd that they
had not arrested Boyd; thus, they told her not to get an attorney, but instead to allow Dr.
Trausch to see her son. When Trausch arrived at the station house late Saturday night,
he hypnotized Boyd without Boyd's consent. Boyd Proceedings, Feb. 18, supra note 22, at
13, 22. At 3:30 a.m. Sunday, July 19, 1981, Boyd confessed to smothering Kozinski.
Boyd Motion to Suppress, supra note 22, at 1. An autopsy later revealed that Kozinski
was strangled to death, and an ondontology report showed that the teethmarks all over
her body were not Boyd's. Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 3; Silberman, supra note 22, at 32.
77 Boyd Motion to Suppress, supra note 22, at 15.
78 Boyd Proceedings Feb. 18, supra note 22, at 88, 92, 96, 180 (in cross-examination of
Dr. Trausch, the defense established that Dr. Trausch used hypnotic techniques on Boyd
but did not tell Boyd that techniques were hypnotic); Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28,
supra note 22, at 97 (in direct examination of Dr. Orne, the defense established that Dr.
Trausch used hypnosis on Boyd); Silberman, supra note 22, at 30.
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inadmissible. 79
Because hypnosis can be induced without the knowledge and
therefore without the consent of the subject, courts should not admit hypnotically induced confessions unless the suspect or defendant, in the presence of counsel, gives informed consent to the use of
hypnosis.8 0 The aid of counsel is necessary to prevent the prosecution from preying on' the defendant's ignorance of the possibility
that the hypnosis may produce incriminating admissions or confessions that the prosecution can use against the defendant in a court
of law.8 1 No safeguard can entirely prevent deceptive uses of hypnosis, such as the "relaxation technique" used by the prosecution in
Boyd. The requirement of informed consent in the presence of
counsel, however, will at least diminish deceptions about the highly
82
suggestive and potentially coercive nature of hypnosis.
79 Silberman, supra note 22, at 32. Dr. Udolf has stated:
In view of the fact that the induction of hypnosis requires the cooperation of the
subject, the question arises how it could ever be considered to be involuntary. The
answer is that involuntary does not mean against the will of but without the consent of the
subject. It would appear to be impossible to hypnotize a subject who actively resists
hypnosis; however, it is quite possible to induce hypnosis and get the subject's cooperation in a setting that he does not recognize as hypnosis. Examples of this
would be describing the procedure as relaxation.
R. UDOLF, supra note 16, at 102 (emphasis in original).
For cases involving deceptive uses of hypnosis by prosecutors on defendants, see
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (doctor does not label technique, but experts call it
hypnosis); Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1969), vacated, 396 U.S. 482 (1970)
(confession held involuntary where doctor's touching, patting, and stroking of defendant amounted to typical persuasive techniques capable of yielding hypnotic trance); Rex
v. Booher, 4 D.L.R. 795 (Can. 1928) (confession held involuntary where induced by
doctor who claimed to practice mesmerism but not hypnotism); Hypnotically-InducedFalse
Confession to Murder, supra note 61, at 5d (confession held invalid in unreported case
where suspect explicitly consented to hypnosis but neither had an attorney nor understood possibility of making incriminating statements while under hypnosis).
80 See, e.g., Leyra, 347 U.S. at 561 (due process does not permit use of psychiatrically
induced confessions extracted from lone defendant unprotected by counsel); State v.
Nemoir, 62 Wis. 2d 206, 214 N.W.2d 297 (1974) (requiring consent in presence of
counsel to admit into evidence polygraph test results); R. UDOLF, supra note 16, at 11112 (the results of involuntary hypnosis should never be admitted in court; if the proponent proves proper management of hypnosis and informed consent to hypnosis, hypnotically induced evidence should be admissible).
81 See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination forbids admissibility of evidence based on psychiatric interview of defendant who was not warned of his right to remain silent); People v. Boggs, 107 Cal.
492, 290 P. 618 (1930) (for consent to be legal, subject must intelligently understand the
possible consequences of the act); People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 358, 98 N.E.2d 553,
559 (1951) (court unwilling to allow state to establish relationship between doctor and
defendant in order for doctor to mentally coerce defendant into making a confession).
82 See, e.g., Hypnotically-Induced False Confession to Murder, supra note 61, at 5a. The
authors relate the story of an unpublished case in which a teenaged suspect in a murder
case consented, without aid of counsel, to let the police hypnotize her. Present at the
audiotaped hypnosis were the suspect, a physician hired by the police, two men from the
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After proving that the defendant knowingly consented to the
use of hypnosis in the presence of counsel, the party seeking to admit the hypnotically induced confession in court must prove that the
prosecution did not conduct the hypnosis in an impermissibly suggestive or coercive manner.8 3 Adherence to Dr. Orne's guidelines
will provide an adequate record from which the court can evaluate
84
the suggestibility and reliability of the hypnotic procedure.
Finally, in order for a hypnotically induced confession to be admissible in court, the confession should be independently verifiable.8 5

Psychiatrists trained in the use of hypnosis agree that

police department, and one man from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The
prehypnotic interview began thus:
Q Now, we want to advise you of certain things things [sic] Tina, before we proceed with this. You realize that you're here to be placed under hypnosis by Dr.
Kroger?
A: Yes.
Q Okay, and this is voluntary on your part.
A: Yes.
Q What were the other things you suggested?
A: Only that she agree that Dr. Kroger will induce the hypnosis and that it is
voluntary.
Q. Okay, it is voluntary on your part and [questioner interrupted by following
response]
A: Yes.
Q. That's probably all we need. Anything on Miranda?
Q If you think it's necessary, I don't think it would hurt. . . . [reading of Miranda
rights. . .

.]

Q. Okay, having them in mind, will you voluntarily freely proceed with this?
A: Yes.
Q Okay, I think we are all set.
Id. The session progressed with the doctor unfolding most of the story and seeking
confirmation of the tale from the suspect. The suspect never actually confessed to the
murder, but she had assented to enough of the story laid out by her "friends," that the
police arrested her and charged her with the murder. Id. at la. The charges were
dropped when defense counsel proved that there were major inaccuracies in the hypnotically induced "confession." Id. Unlike the defendant in Boyd, the suspect in this case
consented to the use of hypnosis. Id. at 5a. The police, however, did not warn the
suspect that hypnosis induces a highly suggestible state of mind that may cause a subject
to make self-incriminating statements regardless of whether those statements are true.
Thus, the case demonstrates that hypnosis in the hands of the prosecution against a
defendant unaided by counsel amounts to deceptive mental coercion. As the authors
reporting this case stated:
The transcript is replete with proforma disclaimers, of "you don't have to answer
unless you want to answer," in place of threats there are inducements; it is all very
sophisticated. Yet, somehow, one walks away from the transcript shocked at the
rape of the mind, somehow even the more dirty for the mendacious disclaimers of
the rapist, astride his victim, that "well, hypnotized minor, you don't really have to
continue with the sexual act, if you don't want to do it."
Id. at 3a.
83 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 533, 432 A.2d at 90.
84 Id. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96; see supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
85 Use and Misuse of Hypnosis, supra note 11, at 72-73 (independent verification is the
only way to guarantee veracity of hypnotically induced information).

1984]

HYPNOSIS OF THE ACCUSED

1013

hypnosis does not guarantee the truthfulness of hypnotically induced statements, but merely aids in memory recall. 8 6 The scientific
community also agrees that false confessions to crimes are common
when someone has a psychological need to expunge feelings of guilt
or gain attention. 8 7 Under hypnosis, the subject's desire to gain
favorable attention by pleasing the hypnotist often outweighs the
subject's capacity to critically judge the veracity and consequences
of their statements. 88 Consequently, in order to prove the truth of a
hypnotically induced confession, and thus sustain the burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the party seeking to admit
the hypnotically induced confession must independently verify the
confession.
C.

HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED EXCULPATORY STATEMENTS

In Greenfield v. Commonwealth, the police accused Greenfield of
murder, and Greenfield underwent hypnosis at the request of his
own attorney because Greenfield could not remember anything
about the murder.8 9 The hypnosis did not induce any new memories, and the doctor who hypnotized Greenfield concluded from the
86 Id.; see also Hurd, 86 NJ. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92; People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523,
532-35, 453 N.E.2d 484, 487-89, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 258-60 (1983); R. UDOLF, supra note
16, at 71.
87 Dr. Udolf states that "some mentally disturbed people have so great a need for
punishment or attention that they confess to crimes they could not possibly have committed." R. UDOLF, supra note 16, at 100.
88 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 539-40, 432 A.2d at 93. Dr. Orne states that the likelihood of a
false confession under hypnosis is greater than under normal circumstances because of
the suggestive procedure of hypnosis:
Why do people ever confess[?], .. because
False confessions are common ....
the opinion that the person interrogating you has of you becomes more important
They confess for that good opinion. In hypto them (sic] than anything else ....
nosis, the need to please the hypnotist is vastly increased ... especially if there are
guilt feelings ....
Psychological needs are what determines [sic] not what is logiUnder those circumstances he might well come
cally in their [sic] self-interest ....
out with things that are against his long-term interest but satisfy the psychological
need of the moment.
Boyd Proceedings 6190, Feb. 28, supra note 22, at 109-11.
89 214 Va. 710, 713, 204 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1974), writ of habeus corpus denied sub nom.
Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1117 (W.D. Va. 1976). The police accused
Greenfield of murdering a female friend one evening after work. The girl had given
Greenfield a ride home from work and as he got out of the car, Greenfield fainted. 413
F. Supp. at 1116. The next thing Greenfield could recall was that he was lying on the
ground some 15 feet from the driver's side of the car, and that the deceased was lying in
a pool of blood in the front seat. Id. Greenfield noticed his pocket knife on the floor of
the car, saw that his hands were cut and bleeding, and ran from the scene. Id. Under
hypnosis, Greenfield could not recall anything more about the time between when he
fainted and when he woke up. Id. at 1117. But under hypnosis, Greenfield did recall
that after he woke up, he chased a man from the scene who was wearing a jacket similar
to his own jacket. 413 F. Supp. at 1117.
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hypnosis that Greenfield was unconscious at the time of the murder. 90 Greenfield's attorney sought to admit both the doctor's opinion regarding the defendant's state of being at the time of the
murder, as well as the defendant's hypnotically induced statements.9 1 Greenfield's attorney sought these admissions "in order to
fully develop [Greenfield's] defense because there were no eyewitnesses to the crime, he had no memory of having committed the
crime, and he was not identified as the man seen running from the
scene of the crime." 9 2 The court held that although the doctor's
opinion regarding the defendant's unconsciousness during the
crime was admissible, the doctor was not allowed to refer to the
hypnosis to help explain the basis of his opinion that Greenfield was
unconscious at the time of the murder. 93 Nor was the defense permitted to admit the substance of the defendant's hypnotically induced statements because of the "potential unreliability" of
94
hypnotic evidence.
Likewise, in People v. Hangsleben, the police accused the defendant of committing two murders, and the defendant underwent hypnosis at the request of his attorney because the defendant could not
accurately remember the events of the two murders. 95 In court,
Hangsleben's attorney first sought to call the psychiatrist who hypnotized Hangsleben to testify to Hangsleben's hypnotically induced
90 413 F. Supp. at 1117.
91 Id.

Id. at 1120.
93 Id. at 1117.
94 413 F. Supp. at 1120. The defendant could not testify on his own behalf from
present memory refreshed because he had not remembered anything under hypnosis.
The defendant's counsel apparently did not require the hypnotist to make audio or visual tapes of the hypnotic procedure. Thus, the defendant's counsel sought to have the
doctor relate to the court the substance of the hypnotic session or to have the defendant
testify under hypnosis in court. 214 Va. at 715, 716, 204 S.E.2d at 419; 413 F. Supp. at
1117. In affirming the state court's denial of either method of admitting the substance
of the defendant's hypnotically induced statements, the United States district court
stated:
This court knows of no rule that requires a judge to accept evidence of uncertain
value to go to a defense that is otherwise completely uncorroborated. The mere
fact that the crime has no eyewitness or direct evidence does not warrant a court to
accept evidence that may be able to tell the trier of fact something about the crime,
but may also be of dubious quality.
413 F. Supp. at 1120-21.
95 86 Mich. App. 718, 728, 273 N.W.2d 539, 543 (1978). The police charged Hangsleben with the slaying of two girls who lived across the street from him. Id. at 720, 273
N.W.2d at 540. Hangsleben's attorney hired a psychiatrist who hypnotized Hangsleben.
Id. at 727-28, 273 N.W.2d at 543. Under hypnosis, Hangsleben recalled that he was in
the girls' house on the night of the murders, but that a third person had killed the girls.
Id. at 727, 273 N.W.2d at 543.
92
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statements and to play an audiotape of the hypnotic conversation.9 6
The court held that the psychiatrist could not testify as to the substance of the hypnotic session and that the defense could not play a
tape of the hypnotic session, because the defense had failed to lay an
adequate foundation for the reliability of hypnosis.97
Because Hangsleben testified in his own behalf and told the
jury a different story than what he had told the police prior to being
hypnotized, the defense also sought permission to make reference
to the hypnosis in order "to bolster the credibility of defendant's
story at trial by arguing that the hypnosis had a mind-jogging effect,
which would help explain defendant's earlier inconsistent admissions to police."9 8s The court held that the defendant's counsel
could not make reference to the hypnotic session because he had
again "failed to establish the reliability of hypnosis as a memory jogging device." 9 9
Thus, a failure to establish the reliability of hypnotically induced statements was the rationale for the exclusion of evidence
that may have aided the defendants in both Greenfield and Hangsleben.
If the defendants' counsel had followed Dr. Ome's guidelines for
the management of hypnotic sessions, the courts in Greenfield and
Hangsleben should have admitted the substance of the defendants'
hypnotically induced statements as well as the medical conclusions
drawn from the hypnotic sessions; adherence to Orne's guidelines
ensures that the hypnotically induced evidence will be reliable
enough to admit in court.1 0 0
Furthermore, courts should admit such evidence even if the defendants' counsel cannot independently verify the hypnotically induced exculpatory statement because the only burden the defense
bears in a criminal trial is to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendants' guilt in the minds of the jurors. 1° 1 Thus, the lack of inId. at 727, 273 N.W.2d at 543.
Id. at 728, 730-31, 273 N.W.2d at 544-45. The court continued:
the only factual foundation offered to the trial court was defendant's assertion that
the witness was a qualified psychiatrist. In his brief defendant also quotes the Encyclopedia Britannica which merely defines ... the theory of hypnotic memory restoration. That does not demonstrate ... general scientific acceptance ....
Absent
an impartial showing that hypnosis has been successful in restoring the memory of
persons other than defendant, either by testimony of other subjects or experts, the
references in this case were properly rejected as being of tenuous probative value.
Id. at 730-31, 273 N.W.2d at 545.
98 Id. at 728, 273 N.W.2d at 543 (testimony conflicted as to whether defendant ever
actually confessed to killing the girls).
99 Id. at 730, 273 N.W.2d at 544.
100 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 538-46, 432 A.2d at 94-97.
101 But see supra notes 73, 85-88 and accompanying text, explaining that when the
prosecution seeks to admit a hypnotically induced confession in a criminal trial, the
96
97
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dependent verification should go to the weight and not to the
admissibility of the exculpatory statement. When the only evidence
at defendants' disposal with which to raise that doubt in the minds
of the jurors is the defendants' own memories, unlocked through
the use of hypnosis, courts should admit the substance of those
memories into evidence once defendants' counsel have established
their reliability. Inherent in defendants' right to due process are the
10 2
rights to testify and to produce testimony in their own defense.
Courts should admit hypnotically induced exculpatory statements as
additional testimony for juries to consider in their determinations of
guilt or innocence. Whether the hypnotically induced testimony will
have the effect of reducing or enhancing the defendants' credibility
with the jury is a risk for the defendants and their counsel to consider. 10 3 Once the defendants' counsel have established the reliability of the testimony by showing adherence to Dr. Orne's guidelines,
the court's only job is to see to it that the defense admits the hypnotically induced evidence in accordance with the applicable state, common law, or federal rules of evidence.
The defense could seek to admit the substance of a defendant's
hypnotic session at trial in several ways. The defense could:
1. Place the defendant on the stand to testify from hypnot10 4
ically refreshed memory.
2. Play audio or video tapes of the session for the jury if the
05
defendant does not wish to take the stand.'
3.
Place the psychiatrist or psychologist who performed the
hypnosis on the stand to testify to the substance of the session
and/or to their medical opinion of the defendant's state of being at
06
the time of the crime, based on the hypnotic interview.1
4. Place the defendant under hypnosis while the defendant is
07
on the stand.
prosecution must independently verify the confession because the prosecution bears the
burden of establishing the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
102 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (due process includes right to present
exculpatory evidence to establish innocence).
103 See, e.g., Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. at 730, 273 N.W.2d at 544 (ordinarily any reference to hypnotic memory restoration tends to impeach, rather than rehabilitate, the
credibility of a defendant's present memory); contra State ex rel. Collins v. Superior
Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 185-86, 644 P.2d 1266, 1271-72 (1982) (lay people believe hypnosis prevents lying, and juries are likely to give hypnotically induced evidence undue
weight).
104 See, e.g., Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 273 N.W.2d 539 (1978).
105 See, e.g., Greenfield, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974), writ of habeas corpus denied
sub nom. Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976).
106 Id.
107 Id.
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Some of these methods are more likely than others to conflict
with rules of evidence. The psychiatrist's statement of what the defendant said while under hypnosis will bring an objection of hearsay, and it will be difficult for the defense to squeeze such testimony
into one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.10 8 Likewise, most
courts have thus far disallowed the hypnotizing of a defendant or
witness while on the stand for fear that the dramatics of the procedure will muddle the judgment of the jury. 10 9 Courts should, however, allow a defendant to testify from hypnotically refreshed
memory, 1 10 or to present a video or audiotape of the hypnotic
session."'
108 Most courts, however, have allowed psychiatrists to state that they used hypnosis
to help determine the defendant's mental state. See People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602
P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979); People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963); State v. Turner, 81 N.M. 450, 468 P.2d 421 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 81 N.M. 506, 469 P.2d 151 (1970); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414
(1974); cf. People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 366 P.2d 314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961);
Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 273 N.W.2d 539 (1978); Greenfield v. Commonwealth,
214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974), writ of habeas corpus denied sub nom. Greenfield v.
Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976). Likewise, most experts deem hypnosis a
valid tool to use in the determination of a subject's mental state. See R. UDOLF, supra
note 16, at 62, 117.
109 See, e.g., Greenfield, 214 Va. at 710, 204 S.E.2d at 414 (noting that other courts have
not considered it an error to disallow any reference to hypnosis by the defense because
the use of hypnosis unduly influences the jury).
110 For cases holding that both the prosecution and the defense may use witnesses
who have been hypnotized prior to trial and who will testify at trial from present memory refreshed, with the fact of hypnosis going to the weight rather than the admissibility
of the hypnotically refreshed testimony, see United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir.
1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Nariciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Mich. 1977); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. App. 1979); Collier v. State, 244 Ga.
553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga.
136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848
(1979); Pearson v. Indiana, 441 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. 1982); Strong v. State, 435 N.E.2d 969
(Ind. 1982); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423
(Mo. App. 1980); State v. Hurd, 86 NJ. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97
N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040
(1982); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v.Jorgensen, 8 Or.
App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981);
Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
111 See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 732-33, 382 P.2d 33, 39-40, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 231 (1963) (it is error to exclude explanation of hypnotic techniques used in a
psychiatric examination as a basis of expert opinion; it is error to exclude, without any
consideration of its admissibility, evidence in the form of a tape recording of the defendant's statements while under hypnosis); People v. Thomas, Crim. No. 3274 (Cal. Ct.
App.Jan. 9, 1969) (court admitted film of defendant under hypnosis to establish defendant's lack of intent to commit crime) (reported in Comment, Hypnosis as a Defense Tactic,
1969 U. TOL. L. REV. 691).
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If, on the one hand, after having undergone hypnosis, defendants desire to testify in court from hypnotically refreshed memories
about the events in question, the prior use of hypnosis will go to the
weight and credibility of the evidence and not to the admissibility of
the evidence.' 1 2 On the other hand, situations will arise in which a
defendant does not want to take the stand or perhaps still has no
3
present memory of the crime and therefore cannot take the stand. "
In those situations, courts should admit into evidence the audio or
videotapes of the hypnotic session"1 4 unless the party opposed to
the admission of the tapes can show that the risk of misleading or
unfairly prejudicing thejury will outweigh the probative value of the
hypnotically induced testimony. 115 With proper jury instructions,
however, aimed at demystifying the hypnotic procedure and emphasizing the "fallibility of human memory" ' 1 6 under normal as well as
hypnotic conditions, courts should be able to admit most tapes of
hypnotic procedures. Furthermore, in cases like Greenfield v. Robinson, where defendants' hypnotically induced statements and the doctors' medical conclusions based on those statements are the only
evidence that defendants can produce in their own behalf, justice
requires courts to admit the tapes.
112 See, e.g.,supra note 111.
113 See, e.g., Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974), writ of

habeas corpus denied sub nom. Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976).
114 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5)(B), stating that an otherwise trustworthy state-

ment will not be barred by the hearsay rule if "the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts." Adherence to Dr. Orne's guidelines will in many cases produce hypnotic statements as reliable and trustworthy as statements produced by normal
human recall. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 537, 543, 432 A.2d at 92, 95. See also Hypno-Induced Statements, supra note 1, at 40. The author states:
Four arguments are generally urged in support of the exclusion of hearsay statements: (1) the statements are not attended by the solemnity of an oath; (2) the factfinder is unable to observe the demeanor of the out-of-court declarant; (3) the witness may not accurately report the out-of-court declaration; and (4) there is no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Reduced to a common denominator, the
problem is one of assumed unreliability. Indeed, the various exceptions to the
hearsay rule derive from the counter-assumption of reliability. And it is this same
counter-assumption which underlies the argument in favor of the admissibility of
hypno-induced and related statements. Once the proper foundation is established,
• ..the reasons in support of the hearsay rule vanish. Consequently, the hearsay
rule should not be a bar to admissibility.
Id. (citations omitted).
115 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded on grounds of prej-

udice, confusion, or waste of time).
116 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 542, 432 A.2d at 95 (fallibility of human memory poses challenge
to our system ofjustice).
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CONCLUSION

The case law and scientific opinions agree that hypnosis may
produce memory distortions, and that hypnosis will not guarantee
the truthfulness of hypnotically induced statements. Most of the
courts and experts also agree, however, that adherence to Dr.
Orne's procedural guidelines increases the likelihood that hypnotically induced information will be reliable enough to admit in court.
In light of the judicial and scientific consensus on the nature of hypnosis and the capacity of Dr. Orne's guidelines to ensure a high degree of reliability of hypnotically induced statements, courts should
adopt Dr. Orne's guidelines as the test for determining whether to
admit hypnotically induced confessions and exculpatory statements
into evidence.
Criminal suspects and defendants have constitutional rights to
be free from self-incrimination and to aid in their own defenses.
Thus, when the prosecution seeks to admit a hypnotically induced
confession into evidence, the prosecution, in addition to proving adherence to Orne's guidelines, must prove that the defendant gave
voluntary informed consent to the use of hypnosis in the presence
of counsel. Because hypnosis does not guarantee truthfulness, but
merely aids in memory recall, the prosecution also must verify independently the confession to sustain the prosecution's burden of
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, when the defense seeks to admit into evidence a hypnotically induced exculpatory statement, the defense does not have to verify the statement
independently because the defense's only burden in a criminal trial
is to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt in the
minds of the jurors. Justice requires courts to admit such exculpatory statements when the statements contribute to raising that reasonable doubt.
CATHERINE

D.

NARDI

